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ABSTRACT
With the increasing complexity of computing systems and the rise in the number
of risks and vulnerabilities, it is necessary to provide a scalable security situation
awareness tool to assist the system administrator in protecting the critical assets,
as well as managing the security state of the system. There are many methods to
provide security states’ analysis and management. For instance, by using a Firewall
to manage the security state, and/or a graphical analysis tools such as attack graphs
for analysis.
Attack Graphs are powerful graphical security analysis tools as they provide a
visual representation of all possible attack scenarios that an attacker may take to
exploit system vulnerabilities.The attack graph’s scalability, however, is a major con-
cern for enumerating all possible attack scenarios as it is considered an NP-complete
problem. There have been many research work trying to come up with a scalable so-
lution for the attack graph. Nevertheless, non-practical attack graph based solutions
have been used in practice for realtime security analysis.
In this thesis, a new framework, namely 3S (Scalable Security Sates) analysis
frameworkis proposed, which present a new approach of utilizing Software-Defined
Networking (SDN)-based distributed firewall capabilities and the concept of stateful
data plane to construct scalable attack graphs in near-realtime, which is a practical
approach to use attack graph for realtime security decisions. The goal of the proposed
work is to control reachability information between different datacenter segments to
reduce the dependencies among vulnerabilities and restrict the attack graph analysis
in a relative small scope. The proposed framework is based on SDN’s programmable
capabilities to adjust the distributed firewall policies dynamically according to secu-
rity situations during the running time. It apply white-list-based security policies to
limit the attacker’s capability from moving or exploiting different segments by only
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allowing uni-directional vulnerability dependency links between segments. Specifi-
cally, several test cases will be presented with various attack scenarios and analyze
how distributed firewall and stateful SDN data plan can significantly reduce the se-
curity states construction and analysis. The proposed approach proved to achieve a
percentage of improvement over 61% in comparison with prior modules were SDN
and distributed firewall are not in use.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and Motivation
Data centers and networking systems continue to expand and increase in both
size and complexity at a rapid pace. With such expansion, security concerns rise as
attackers’ capability improves and the number of vulnerabilities grow. In order to
have a better understanding and management of the security situation of the system,
strong and efficient analysis tools are needed to assist administrators in protecting the
critical assets. Graphical security analysis (Attack Graph) tools are one of them being
used as methods to understand the weakness of a system. Security state management
is conducted by monitoring and evaluating system’s security components such as Fire-
wall and Intrusion Detection Systems(IDS). It is critical that a system administrator
is able to not only inspect and deploy security rules, but also analyze and evaluate
the current situation and whether or not an improvement is needed to increase the
protection level of the system. Coming back to attack graph as a well-known tool for
security analysis, attack graph’s scalability is still considered as NP-Complete prob-
lem Greiner et al. (2006). Amman et al. Ammann et al. (2002) show that attack
graph scalability problem limits its scope and applicability. There has been no ef-
fective solutions to overcome this problem. Moreover, attack graph-based security
scenario analysis approaches carry the problem of states explosion as described in
Ammann et al. (2002), in which the attack graph represents all the possible attack
scenarios (or states) and it can be exponentially complicated.
To mitigate the state explosion problem, most of existing solutions either tried to
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reduce the dependency among vulnerabilities Ou et al. (2005) or apply an hierarchical
strategy Hong and Kim (2013) to reduce the computing and analysis complexity of
constructing and using attack graphs. For example, Hong and Kim Hong and Kim
(2013) proposed a hierarchical approach for constructing and analyzing full attack
graph by simulation. They compared their model with simplified attack graph, which
represents the network structure only and not the full attack graph information,
where the proposed approach was linearly better than the simplified attack graph.
In Kaynar and Sivrikaya (2016), a framework was proposed for distributed attack
graph generation from hardware aspect through utilizing memory pages to ensure
smooth distribution of the attack graph. In Hong et al. (2013), the authors presented
an approach for attack graph reduction using reduction technique. Specifically, they
showed two formal methods, one is by calculating the full attack path, while the other
method is by increasing an existing path. However, they did not show how effective
their proposed solution is through a real-time solution or experiments, besides it scales
poorly to O(2n) for full path calculation and O(n!) for incremental path calculation.
Using attack graph is essential to enumerate all the possible attack scenarios,
or it can be called security states, for a given computer networking system. None
of previous solutions can effectively address the state explosion issue nor considered
large data center networks with emerging technologies such as SDN and stateful Dis-
tributed Firewall (DFW). To further highlight and expound the state term; state is
meant to be the entire flow state among SDN environment. In the past, state was
referred to the header information being examined. However, state in this thesis de-
scribe the complete implication of the entire flow, from header to application data
where a comprehensive inspection is conducted based on predefined state for each
flow to prevent the attacker from tricking the firewall and bypass protection. The
idea of the proposed research work is to provide security state management along
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with a graphical analysis of critical paths in the system. Therefor, system admin can
make appropriate decision to protect the system. The proposed approach guarantee
that the attacker may not bluff the firewall, since we used a methodology to link the
communication path with destination port and host IP.
There are many research work proposed virtual Large Data Center Networks to
enhance network performance and bandwidth allocation Landis et al. (2010); Guo
et al. (2014). DFW approaches enforces security policy at a different level and com-
ponents of the network. These security policies are deployed (on demand) and change
frequently. A centralized firewall in SDN is not effective as it may block legitimate
traffic according to Hu et al. (2014a). DFW is more reliable when used in SDN
(Software Defined Networking) environment to ensure the ease of use of different
policies and configurations for each network segment or Tenant. However, using SDN
controller to maintain firewall managed security states is not an effective approach.
To address this problem, in this work, we propose to develop an SDN-based stateful
DFW by incorporating OpenState Bianchi et al. (2014) to manage the system security
states in SDN networking environment.
Software Defined Networking (SDN ) is an emerging technology aiming to enhance
the current networking protocols by separating control-plane from data-plane. SDN
breaks down the switch and routers controlling functionality and forwarding func-
tionality to erase the vertical complications according to Lantz et al. (2010). This
method of separation converts the switches in the network into simple forwarding
devices controlled by central controller that coordinates and manages the forwarding
rules (flow rules), which will reduce the complexity of applying and managing differ-
ent flow policies and help in minimizing conflict between those policies.Kreutz et al.
(2015). The separation operation is conducted via software capabilities, application
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Figure 1.1: OpenFlow Protocol Header Fields
programming interface (APIs) particularly, in which the SDN controller takes control
of the data-plane states according to Kreutz et al. (2015). The method or protocol
of deploying SDN controller was studied widely, starting from McKeown et al. (2008)
in which OpenFlow protocol was proposed as a standard protocol to implement SDN
functionalities. The power of OpenFlow is the dynamic property of adding and re-
moving flow rules in switches, without creating conflicts between the rules. Moreover,
the centralization of controller allowed for higher performance and traffic throughput
Bianco et al. (2010). OpenFlow datapath design include flow table and an action
associated with each flow. This exact property will help in designing the DFW as we
will see later.
OpenFlow switches will act based on the flow rules specified by the controller.
Instead of making decision for each packet individually, the controller check for the
first packet in each flow, and generalize the rule for the rest of the flow. This way the
number of packets transmitted over the network is reduced significantly. As for the
basic actions each switch must have; they are 1) Forward the flow. 2) Encapsulate
and forward. 3) Drop the flow packet. McKeown et al. (2008)
Currently, there are several SDN controllers, and many studies conducted comparing
controllers performance and usage Khondoker et al. (2014); Nunes et al. (2014),the
most popular and widely used is OpenDayLight Controller. Figure 1.1 shows the
header fields of OpenFlow protocol flow.
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As for SDN-based data center, it is worth noting that many companies started
to deploy SDN in their infrastructure. For instance, Google announced in 2017 their
plan to introduce SDN to the public Network, and 20% of Google’s traffic is man-
aged using SDN. Also, CISCO, the largest networking devices manufacturing and
provider, has a dedicated plan and products designed specifically for SDN-based data
centers. All of these news and efforts prove that SDN is becoming the new networking
technology every organization will deploy soon or later, and hence, many researcher
are trying to conduct different type of studies either on SDN or using SDN technology.
As of security of SDN, firewall functionality is an essential component of any secu-
rity system. There are many challenges in deploying distributed firewall in SDN-based
environment, especially a stateful one. For instance, conflict resolution as indicated
by Dixit et al. (2018), where certain rules are overlapping with one another or once.
Firewalls shall be capable of handling policy conflict when a flow rule is pushed or
upon path update in the system. Also, for large scale data center, it is of paramount
importance for a firewall to provide support for multi-tenant architecture, and differ-
entiate between address domain for each sub-network.
Back to attack graphs, previous work Cook et al. (2016) worked on generating an
attack graph in distributed manner. The method of parallelism depends on breaking
down the algorithm loops into parallel processes, and the complexity of generating
the attack graph is scaled down by a factor of n or t, where n is the number of nodes
and t is the number of edges to the node. Moreover, Kaynar et al. Kaynar and
Sivrikaya (2016) focused on partitioning the memory of the system where the attack
graph computation occur to add parallelism to attack graph generation. The authors
also provided a virtual shared memory abstraction across distributed agents to avoid
multiple expansion of nodes. The shared virtual memory is used to store the reacha-
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bility graph, hence, any two nodes adjacent will be put in the same memory page to
the distributed agents, which will lead to processing the nodes in the same page with
the same agent without assistant or the need to transfer the page to another agent.
The complexity analysis of the proposed algorithm is based on the messages transfer
and execution time. The maximum number of memory pages faults encountered by
the search agents is O(N * H, where H is the number of edges and N is the number
of hosts in the network. Overall complexity of the proposed system is determined by
O( P + N * H *log(P)), where P is the number of processors or the search agents for
the memory pages. As can be seen from previous work, attack graph scalability
is still a major issue that has not been addressed effectively. As large data center
network grow in both size and complexity, it is of paramount importance to come up
with a solution to make networking management easier for network administrator.
SDN emerged as a solution to solve such a complication, but it also have much more
higher capabilities to enhance the security and provided more accurate and effective
security analysis. To the best of our knowledge, SDN and distributed firewall have
not been used before to address the attack graph scalability issue and address the
state explosion problem though controlling the reachability between the nodes in the
system.
1.2 Contribution
This thesis aim to provide a solution for the complication behind managing and
analyzing security state for large data center networks. The main contribution is
that a SDN-based environment was designed to deploy vulnerability-based stateful
distributed firewall, by utilizing SDN controller and OVS. Moreover, the presented
framework provide scalable graph-based security analysis by incorporating vulnera-
bility information and flow information to get the exact connectivity between the
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hosts inside the data center system. The framework achieve a better performance by
over 60% in comparison with prior models that utilizes attack graph for security anal-
ysis. Other contribution of the work is that it was completed using container based
approach, which is an emerging technology and competitor to traditional virtual ma-
chines. The work also provide an intuition on how to connect multiple container to
OVS in order to allow for local communication as well as communication with the
public network for each container.
1.3 Organization of Thesis
In the following chapters, we will explain more in details on the theory and appli-
cations of designing stateful distributed firewall DFW, the approach used for design,
and finally, the method we followed to utilize distributed firewall functionality to
generate attack graph that is scalable, and in much lower computation time. we will
present related work in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 will provide the details of system design
and implementation. In chapter 4, we explain our work about attack graphs and how
we were able to combine firewall flow polices with vulnerability scanning results in
order to be able to generate a scalable attack graph. Finally, conclusion and future
work is presented in Chapter 5 and Appendix section is followed after that
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Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
Managing security state for any system is crucial to safeguard the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of data. According to Symantec Internet Security Threat
Report sym (2018), the wide spread of software vulnerabilities and ransomewares
O’Gorman and McDonald (2012) create many challenges for system administrator to
protect and defend against. Our goal here is to offer a scalable approach to man-
age the security situation and provide an efficient approach of analysis to allow and
assist the administrator in performing the effective decision. SDN offers great op-
portunities to manage the networking interactions between the control-plane and the
data-plane’s switches using an API. However this new technology eliminate complica-
tions Alkhulaiwi et al. (2016) between switches and controller, there are many security
considerations and challenges that need to be addressed. Administrators now are ca-
pable of controlling a specified network segment or isolate is easily, thanks to SDN.
The question is how and when this isolation should occur, and most importantly,
what criteria or other countermesures can be selected to avoid losing data availabil-
ity, or confidentiality lose. According to Scott-Hayward et al. (2013), one of the main
concerns in the industry is how satisfactory the level of audit process, which device
is connected to which switch, what what level of access the device can have or reach.
SDN security can be categorized into three main points:
• OpenFlow controller related security challenges.
• Switch related security challenges.
• Communication channel between controller and switch security challenges.
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Graph-based Security Models Tree-based Security Mode
Sheyner et al. (2002) Saini et al. (2008)
Swiler et al. (2001) Bistarelli et al. (2006)
Sheyner (2004) Aliari Zonouz (2012)
Ingols et al. (2006) Roy et al. (2012)
Jajodia et al. (2005) Edge (2007)
Ou et al. (2005) Roy et al. (2010)
Table 2.1: Classification of Some of Graphical Security Analysis Tools
In the following sections, we present some of the related work in regards to commu-
nication channel security and how a distributed firewall was implemented to address
those issues. We also show the current work on graphical security analysis and what
tools and methodologies are used evaluate the security state in the system and how
they can be used to identify the critical paths in the system.
2.1 Graphical Security Analysis
Graphical security analysis model can be divided into two main category: 1- At-
tack graphs and 2- Attack Trees. The formal is the main approach for graphical
security analysis, whereas the later is the basis for tree structured model. Many re-
search work was conducted in this area, such as Attack defense trees to study the
effect of hierarchical attack model, and to improve the security assessment capability
Hong et al. (2017). Hong et al. conducted a comprehensive survey on the usability
and application of graphical security models. They classified the existing models to
study its performance in terms of complexity and and life cycle, as well as compare the
availability of tools and what contribution they offer. Chowdhary et al. Chowdhary
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et al. (2018) presented an approach of modeling Markov game to defend and select the
optimal countermeasure selection. The author’s idea was to design a model in which
a reward will be given to each player (attack and defender) for their action, optimal
reward would result in the higher points for defender and lower one for attacker, and
vice versa.
Graphical security analysis models can be classified into 2 main categories as we men-
tioned earlier, however, each category has a sub category, which we show in table 2.1.
There exist other types of security analysis models such as stochastic Petri Net Pe-
terson (1981) and stochastic Reward Net Hirel et al. (2000). Since they suffer from
state explosion problem and they do not follow graphcial approach, the authors of
Hong et al. (2017) did not consider them for comparison with other modules.
Attack Graph Scalability: Attack Graph Toolkit Sheyner et al. (2002) presents
an automated way of generating attack graph. Authors considered attack graph gen-
eration as a minimum set-cover problem and utilized vulnerability information from
Nessus to generate a graph of 19 nodes and 28 edges. The graph generation al-
gorithm, will however not be scalable on a large cloud network. Multi-prerequisite
attack graph generation presented by Ingols et al Ingols et al. (2006) utilizes efficient
data-structures to achieve the worst-case attack graph generation complexity of order
O(E+NlgN), where N is the number of nodes, and E is the number of edges. The
performance results have been evaluated over an attack graph with a few hundred
nodes. Additionally, using a greedy algorithm for the generation of the entire graph
is a slow process. We utilize a distributed graph generation algorithm to a achieve
better scalability on a large network. Lee et al Lee et al. (2009) presented a cut and
divide algorithm to achieve scalable attack graph generation on a large network. The
authors, however, assume the graph structure to balanced, to facilitate division. The
real world networks, however, rarely balance, i.e., some segments may have a large
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number of vulnerabilities, while others may be relatively secured. Albanese et al Al-
banese et al. (2012) use exhaustive search algorithm for attack graph generation, and
estimate the cost for network hardening. The search algorithm can have exponential
complexity in the worst case on a large network. We utilize segment aware attack
graph generation algorithm, which will have linear complexity, O(n), where n is the
number of attack graph nodes.
To show an example of Attack graph scalability, we present the following figure 2.1:
Figure 2.1: An Example of Attack Graph
Where the labels for each shape in the graph mean:
1 ,” execCode ( ’ 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 6 ’ , someUser )” ,”OR” ,0 .8704
2 ,”RULE 2 ( remote e x p l o i t o f a s e r v e r program )” ,
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”AND” ,0 .64
3 ,” netAccess ( ’ 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 6 ’ , tcp , ’ 2 2 ’ ) ” , ”OR” ,0 . 8
4 ,”RULE 6 ( d i r e c t network a c c e s s )” ,”AND” ,0 . 8
5 ,” hac l ( i n t e rne t , ’ 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 6 ’ , tcp , ’ 2 2 ’ ) ” ,
”LEAF” ,1 . 0
6 ,” attackerLocated ( i n t e r n e t )” ,”LEAF” ,1 . 0
7 ,” ne tworkServ i c e In fo ( ’ 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 6 ’ , openssh , tcp ,
’ 22 ’ , someUser )” ,”LEAF” ,1 . 0
8 ,” vu lEx i s t s ( ’ 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 6 ’ , ’CVE−2008−5161 ’ , openssh ,
remoteExploit , p r i v E s c a l a t i o n )” ,”LEAF” ,1 . 0
9 ,”RULE 2 ( remote e x p l o i t o f a s e r v e r program )” ,”AND” ,0 .64
10 ,” netAccess ( ’ 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 6 ’ , tcp , ’ 9 0 9 0 ’ ) ” , ”OR” ,0 . 8
11 ,”RULE 6 ( d i r e c t network a c c e s s )” ,”AND” ,0 . 8
12 ,” hac l ( i n t e rne t , ’ 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 6 ’ , tcp , ’ 9 0 9 0 ’ ) ”
,”LEAF” ,1 . 0
13 ,” ne tworkServ i c e In fo ( ’ 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 6 ’ , s a f a r i , tcp ,
’ 9090 ’ , someUser )” ,”LEAF” ,1 . 0
14 ,” vu lEx i s t s ( ’ 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 6 ’ , ’CVE−2013−2566 ’ ,
s a f a r i , remoteExploit , p r i v E s c a l a t i o n )” ,”LEAF” ,1 . 0
The above figure show an instance of a simple graph with two vulnerabilities only. In
Chapter 4, we show a more sophisticated graph, and how our solution reduced the
complexity of interpreting the graph meaning.
SDN based Attack Graph Generation: SDN allows centralized management
and orchestration in a cloud network. The network controller having a centralized
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view of network traffic and vulnerabilities makes it an ideal candidate for attack graph
generation. Scalable MTD solution presented by Chowdhary et al Chowdhary et al.
(2016) use graph partitioning for attack graph scalability and proactive security. We
build on similar principles, but the sub-attack graph generation and merging process
used in our current work achieve faster graph generation. Chung et al Chung et al.
(2015, 2013) use SDN based attack graph generation and countermeasure evaluation
framework for analyzing the impact of different security countermeasures on the se-
curity state of a network. The graph generation algorithm is polynomial in terms
of the number of network nodes, which can limit the scalability of the attack graph
generation process. We use SDN controller to centrally compose segment graphs, and
achieve 75% reduction in the overhead associated with single attack graph generation
for the entire network.
2.2 SDN-Based Distributed Firewall
Firewalls are one of the essential security components that exist in many systems.
Firewall are capable of filtering or blocking certain type of traffic, whether it belongs
to layer two, layer three, or application layer. There are mainly three type of firewall:
1. Stateful firewall: which allow for state-based inspection of the traffic, and state
here correspond to the traffic state (New or Established for instance).
2. Stateless firewall: in which the firewall act as a static filtering mechanism based
on pre-defined rules.
3. Application firewall: basically an application oriented filter that run in the
application domain and defend against rule violation to a specified filter.
Some of the research work that built SDN-based firewall include Pena and Yu
(2014), where they implemented a simulated environment by using Mininet Team
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(2012) and connecting multiple switches together then testing the ping command,
nevertheless, their approach depend on installing the firewall rule as a flow rule to
show the distributed property of the firewall. Installing some rules as a flow rule
does not effectively address many security challenges and may not defend against
web server vulnerability for example since the attacker may simply act as a normal
user and then compromise that vulnerable server. Moreover, since the controller is
the one responsible for generating and installing the rules, the term distributed has
been eliminated and the controller now is the main engine in the system for defense.
SDN Reactive Stateful Firewall zerkane et al. Zerkane et al. (2016) introduced a
stateful reactive firewall by incorporating the firewall into the SDN architecture. The
authors claim it is stateful since it monitor the connection status and react based on
the state. There are three main components in their design, which is: 1- an orches-
trator that run in the application layer, 2- firewall application running on top of SDN
controller and 3- OpenFlow policies installed in OpenFlow data-plane devices. The
purpose of the orchestrator is to allow the administrator to specify security policy
in the high level, and then those security policies are “propageted” to the controller.
Each firewall instance has a state table to keep track of the states of the flow. Firewall
specify which action the controller should take, which in this regards ease the load on
the controller and only send to it what action to be performed. The authors claim this
will mitigate some attack such as DDoS and SYN Flood attack. This stateful firewall
design lack auto priority handling, multi tenant support, and violation resolution ac-
cording to Dixit et al. (2018). Their evaluation is implemented using Mininet Team
(2012) and the results show that the firewall is capable of processing 1000 connection
requests in about 0.7 ms.
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FLOW GUARD According to Hu et al. (2014b), there are many challenges in
building a SDN firewall, such as
• Examining Dynamic Network Policy Updates
• Checking Indirect Security Violations
• Architecture Option
• Stateful Monitoring
In order to address these challenges, The authors proposed a robust firewalls that
enable effective network-wide access control, namely FLOWGUARD. The framework
accurate detection and policy violation in SDN environment. FLOWGUARD has
several components that configure, verify, and manage the flows through network
state configuration, flow packet violation detection and flow rejection in case of vi-
olation modules. The authors ensured that the framework have enough flexability,
and efficiency to dynamically adopt to network state changes. Evaluation of FLOW-
GUARD was performed using FLOODLIGHT SDN controller Floodlight (2012). The
experiments were conducted using real world network topology, and they achieved a
detection and rejection strategy in 0.03 milliseconds (ms).
SDN-Oriented Stateful Hardware Firewalls Collings and Liu Collings and Liu
(2014) presented a hardware approach into designing a stateful SDN firewall, where
they incorporated the flow rules in both, OpenFlow switches and firewall controller,
where the latter is responsible for making control decisions for unknown flows. The
main idea is to utilize SDN controller to insert and remove rules based on prede-
fined security polices. The authors evaluated their design using GENI test-bed which
provide real world network simulation model. They achieved an overall latency of
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about 30 ms for 300 flows with 1000 rules, however, they did not test their approach
for distributed multiple network segments. Moreover, the authors did not consider
evaluating the security state after deploying the proposed firewall.
Multi-level Stateful Firewall Mechanism for SDN Naif and Kotulski Nife and
Kotulski (2017), presented an approach to design a reactive stateful firewall based
on OVS data. They relied in their work upon having the SDN controller to spec-
ify the pre-defined state, which is a simple “match action paradigm ”. The firewall
application is centralized above the control plane. They compared their work with
other SDN security module that either offer protection against DoS attack or having
a simple filtering mechanism. Authors claim that their proposed solution only need
26-bytes for each flow entry in the STable, where they store the states; however, there
is no real evaluation nor implementation for their solution on a real system, nor the
authors identified how the OpenFlow devices will communicate with each other to
ensure there is no redundancy or conflict between them.
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Chapter 3
SYSTEM DESIGN, MODELING, AND MANAGEMENT
In this Chapter, we present the proposed system architecture design in terms of: 1-
System components and how they are connected. 2- Details of traffic flow from source
until destination 3- Different stages of security states and how they are handled in
such SDN-based environment. A comprehensive explanation of the environment walk-
through is presented as well to show a proof of concept for our proposed framework.
3.1 System and Architecture Components
The proposed system rely heavily upon Software Defined Networking architecture,
especially SDN Controller. There are many types of controllers that follow OpenFLow
protocol specifications such as OpenDayLight Controller, Pox, etc. a comparative
study was conducted to emphasize on each one by Khondoker et al. (2014).
In addition to SDN controller, We use OpenState Bianchi et al. (2014), which is a
proposed open source tool that utilizes Mealy-based eXtended Finite State Machine
(XFSM) to model and handle flow states in SDN environment. The goal of Open-
State is to allow the programmer not only to include states in the OpenFlow device,
but also the ability to manage those states and the devicse shall be able to handel
the state without controller assistant.
The goal is to design a stateful firewall capable of distinguishing benign flow from
malicious one by monitoring the current state of the traffic and the vulnerabilities in
the system. Open Virtual Switch (OVS) Lantz et al. (2010), is used as OpenFlow
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data-plane device to receive and execute controller’s commands and flow rules. OVS
is essential for open state as the XFSM tables actions are being pushed in there and
it is responsible to forward the traffic for the destination or to Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) to inspect the malicious traffic. Next, the ongoing security vulnera-
bility and critical paths in the system are modeled using attack graph. A proposed
modeling approach is being used to reduce the scalability of the graph via controlling
reachability by distributed firewall policies.
Figure 3.1: System Architecture of The Proposed System
The proposed framework is presented in Figure 3.1, where the application layer
has the vulnerability scanner, the security policy generator based on OpenState, and
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finally the attack graph module that will compute and generate the attack graph for
the system. The next layer is the Control layer in which the SDN controller resides
and act as a meditate between the upper modules and the data-plane layer. Con-
troller job is to manage the connectivity across the system, by receiving the security
policy from the policy generator, converting it into a flow rule, and push it to OVS.
The next layer is the data-plane layer where OVS is responsible to execute the flow
rules as well as monitoring the state of the connected machines. If there exist a
connection to a vulnerable machine, OVS forward the traffic to an IDS for further
inspection. Once an alert is generated, it is sent to the security policy module gen-
erator to execute and update the current security policy and block the malicious flow.
3.1.1 OpenState
OpenState Bianchi et al. (2014) was introduced by Bianchi et al. as a solution to
bring and provide states for SDN data-plane. The authors utilized eXtended Finite
State Machines (XFSM) as the main technique to allow switches at the data-plane
level to be programmable. The goal was to add intelligent techniques to the switches
and reduce the load and decision making from being done in the controller. More-
over, allowing switches to maintain states is not enough, it is necessary to provide
state management for the devise itself Bianchi et al. (2014). Therefor, Finite State
Machines were selected to fulfill this requirement.
OpenState was implemented using two main tables: 1- State tables; which hold
the state for each flow, and 2- XFSM table; where each state is linked with a state key,
triggering event, associated action, and next state label. Figure 3.2 shows an example
of mealy type state machine. Each state is represented by a circle. To have a valid
19
transition from one state to another, a valid triggering event must occur, otherwise,
the next state is still the current state. We explain more in details about OpenState
in a later section 3.1.4.
To highlight on different state management schemes for states in SDN data-plane
layer, we show a comparison in table 3.1. The table emphasized the scalability of the
approach, what data structure it used, and what is the type of the scheme. We choose
OpenState for our design for it’s simplicity and availability of code in comparison to
the other modules.
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Figure 3.2: An example of Mealy Finite State Machine
3.1.2 Distributed Firewall (DFW)
Firewalls are one of the important security elements in any networking system.
They can control the flow of packets from one node to another by inspecting the
traditional five tuples (source and destination IP address, source and destination
port number, and protocol). There are three types of firewalls, stateless, stateful,
or application firewall. Application firewall basically is an application oriented filter
that run in the application domain and defend against rule violation to a specified
filter. It control the input/output and access to and from an application by blocking
any unmatched traffic. For example, an organization specify an access policy to
whom can access to sensitive data servers which will help in preventing unwanted
and unauthorized access. Stateless firewall is essentially a filtering mechanism to
remove (or drop) unwanted traffic based on static information such as IP address,
access control list (ACL). They do not account for traffic state nor they monitor
network status. A stateless firewall can also serve as an access gateway to allow or
deny certain type of traffic or users from entering to some unauthorized areas by
comparing the pre-specified rule sets and check for a match. On the other hand,
the stateful firewall has the capability to monitor network traffic in order to inspect
any path change in the network. Moreover, a stateful firewall can watch specific
connection stage in TCP protocol (SYN, SYN-ACK, etc) Mojidra (2016). They add
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to the filtering mechansim monitoring functionality to watch for the newly opened
ports by any connection. In essence, stateful firewall add Layer-4 realization to the
basic filtering model.
Modern DFW Architectures
There has been a shift in paradigm from host-centric model to the data-centric model.
The network services and computation capacity is available closer to the users. One
of the emerging solution to prevent lateral movement of attack in the network is the
usage of microsegmentation via a distributed firewall. The distributed firewall model
proposed by microsegmentation allows segmentation of the network at various lay-
ers of abstraction - layer 2,3,4 or segmentation of application workloads within the
same layer, e.g., web-application layer, database layer, etc. A segmented network
thus protects workloads against attacks even when the attacker has footprint within
a network segment.
Existing microsegmentation solutions such as VMWare NSX Ferrari (2014) satisfy
recommendations listed in NIST 800-125b Chandramouli and Chandramouli (2016)
guidelines (VM-FW-R1-3). We use object oriented microsegmentation model to cre-
ate security policies at the abstraction level of security and user-level groups, thus sat-
isfying all the recommendations above. Additionally, both VMWare ESX and CISCO
ACI Morgan (2014) frameworks allow the creation of microsegmentation within a
multi-segment cloud network.
The drawback of such an architecture is that SDN architecture forwards every new
traffic request to the SDN controller. With the security policies at the granularity of
per-application, workload, flow-state, SDN controller may be quickly overwhelmed,
and make the security assessment quite slow. We incorporated a light-weight state
monitoring capability in our architecture to achieve the same capabilities as modern
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DFW architectures while limiting the impact on the network performance. If a cen-
tralized firewall is used in an SDN environment and the SDN controller is enforced
to track every connection, the attacker can launch a saturation attack as described
in AVANTGUARD Shin et al. (2013). Also, a centralized firewall can not detect and
defend against attacks in data-plane layer Dixit et al. (2018).
In order to restrict traffic between different segments, it is important to have
some sort of mechanism that allows us to control the flow through the communica-
tion paths. The obvious solution is to use a firewall. Nevertheless, deploying a central
firewall will suffer from a single point of failure issue. Moreover, different segments
will have different security requirements, which is impossible for a central firewall to
accommodate all at once. The policies for distributed firewall are centrally gener-
ated and managed, nevertheless, those policies are pushed into the OpenFlow devices
(OVS) to be maintained.
In our case where we utilize the SDN, DFW will resolve the problem of flow policy
violation by setting up an individual firewall for each entry Hu et al. (2014b). The
several firewalls will be synchronized by maintaining connectivity with the SDN con-
troller, which is responsible for generating the state tables as we will explain in the
next sections.
Some researcher addressed DFW in SDN Hu et al. (2014b) Satasiya et al. (2016)
Pena and Yu (2014). However, they only consider stateless firewall which does not
leverage the full advantage of both SDN and DFW. VMware has proposed a dis-
tributed firewall for their NSX model, by using a central object that manages the
distributed firewall’s policies Mojidra (2016). Unfortunately, this architecture is only
applicable to the NSX model and cannot be adopted to OpenFlow standards, because
NSX comprises of stateful and stateless components. The firewall rules of the host
machines are also controlled by the NSX manager. Whereas the OpenFlow imple-
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ments a stateless firewall. Also, NSX follows a distributed firewall model, and SDN
is a centralized controller model, which is another difference.
There are many challenges and research questions that need to be addressed to
consider stateful firewall implementation. Initially, all the intelligence work in SDN
was designated to the controller Dargahi et al. (2017), and switches were dedicated to
maintaining stateless forwarding tables based on the controller. However, this is not
the case anymore as stateful SDN introduces the concept of empowering switches to
partially control incoming flows. For the case of a multi-segment data center, which
is the focus of this thesis, network configuration will change dynamically as well as
the flow states. This alternation raises the need for stateful rules that can be con-
figured inside the switch to satisfy each segments’ requirements, either from security
or networking point of view. As we will see later, utilizing the state of the SDN flow
and the state of the existing system’s vulnerabilities can result in such alike stateful
firewall.
25
3.1.3 System Design
In the previous sections, the system architecture and components were introduced.
The rest of the chapter will show the detailed flow of the system components and what
are the dependencies between them.
To illustrate the flow of the system, consider Figures 3.3 and 3.4, which shows the
flow chart of the system. The first step is to conduct vulnerability scanning results,
which is the base to build the stateful firewall and evaluate the security situation
of the system. The scanning results are sent to the controller in order to generate
the XFSM table with the assistance of OpenState. XFSM table include information
about the vulnerable service in a certain sub-domain. This domain shall be under
OVS observation since OVS will be responsible to forward the flow to IDS/IPS or
block it if an intrusion was identified. The procedure on how to generate the state
table will be explained shortly. The SDN controller will now push the generated
state tables to the OVS, and OVS will track flow based on the specified flow key and
associated state. If a state indicate a flow is suspicious, then the flow is forwarded
to IDS/IPS for further inspection and examination. Next, a decision will be made
to determine whether the flow will be forwarded to the destination or get blocked. If
the flow is benign, it will be returned to OVS to be forwarded to final destination,
otherwise, it gets dropped. If no state was found, OVS send the flow headers and
wait for forwarding rule decision.
The previously described procedure show how to combine both, centralized deci-
sion making and distributed rule enforcement, which is crucial for Distributed Firewall
(DFW) to have. SDN controller will manage and push the flow rules based on Open-
State module, each OVS will enforce those rules and maintain the security state of
each network segment it is attached to. Hence, distributed functionality is main-
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tained in addition to adding intelligent property for the OVS devices. The purpose
of designing a DFW is that:
• It is a software-based firewall, which essentially means it can be easily enabled
or disabled on any network segment or interface.
• The design needs to support stateful firewall to handle the situation if a mali-
cious traffic (i.e. traffic associated with known vulnerability and port number)
is detected, which results in enabling detailed packet filtering policies according
to the flow states.
Figure 3.3: Flow Chart Diagram of The Proposed System
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Figure 3.4: Flow Diagram of The Proposed System
3.1.4 OpenState Tables Generation
OpenState was proposed by Bianchi et al. Bianchi et al. (2014) to support state
management in OpenFlow enabled switches. OpenState relys on Mealy eXtended
Finite State Machine (XFSM) to describe the current flow state, trigring event for
each flow based on flow key, what action is executed for each event, and finally what
is the next state. To illustrate on OpenState XFSM, let’s consider the following
example:
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Concrete Example:
Suppose we have a sub-net with the following hosts and vulnerability information
shown in table 3.2:
Host Vulnerability CVE ID Port
192.168.1.10 WebDAV vulnerability in IIS CVE 2009-1535 135
192.168.1.11 Squid port scan CVE 2001-1030 200
192.168.1.12 None NA NA
Table 3.2: Sub-net Configuration Example
We assume there is a dedicated agent for each network segment responsible for
vulnerability scanning, and later on attack graph computation. The agent will provide
the information shown in the table above to controller. The controller will query
for the mentioned CVE IDs and get more detailed information, which then sent to
security policy module to examine and generate the distributed firewall rules.
to elaborate on OpenState we explain the requirments for generating the tables as
follows:
• Flow Key: which is defined by Destination IP and Port number
• State: The state is assigned depending on whether a vulnerability exist or not.
• Event: Incoming Connection from another node to a specific port.
• Action: The action is set either forward to IDS/IPS, wait for security clearance,
or forward to Controller.
• Next State: What state should the rest of the flow get?
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Figure 3.5 shows the State table in the top and the XFSM table at the bottom of the
figure. once a flow come in, OpenState module locate the associated state label for
this flow. Next, the module check XFSM table to see if the associated triggering event
for this state is present for in the flow, if so, the action will be associated and the
next state label will be assigned for the flow and get updated in the upper state table.
Figure 3.5: State and XFSM Tables of OpenState
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3.2 Stateful Distributed Firewall Implementation Details
In this section, we will present the approach to implement the DFW functionality,
as well as what exact software/components are being used and utilized for this pur-
pose. Before carrying on with the rest of the chapter, it is important to point out that
these component are being developed and tested using a limited processing hardware
device, and the idea can be replicated for each network segment to build the entire
DFW. The purpose is to provide a proof of concept through real implementation of
the proposed systems.
3.2.1 Operating System and Networking virtualization
To start with the implementation, we used Dell laptop with Intel I-7 2.6 GHz
processor with 16GB RAM. The running operating system on the machine is Windows
10. Next, we installed Oracle VirtualBox Version 5.2.6 as a base hypervisor to host
virtual machines. We installed Ubuntu 14.04 there to run and do all the experiments.
The required main components for our environment testing include:
• Open Virtual Switch (OVS)
• SDN Controller
• Linux Containers (lxc)
• Snort IDS/IPS
Inside ubuntu terminal, we begin by installing the above requirements using the
following commands:
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1− i n s t a l l a t i o n o f OVS:
$ apt−get update
$ apt−get i n s t a l l −y g i t automake autoconf gcc uml−u t i l i t i e s
l i b t o o l bui ld−e s s e n t i a l g i t
$ g i t c l one https : // github . com/ openvswitch / ovs . g i t
$ cd ovs
$ . / boot . sh
$ . / c o n f i g u r e − −with−l i nux=/ l i b /modules/ u n a m e − r / bu i ld
$ make && make i n s t a l l
$ insmod datapath / l i nux / openvswitch . ko
$ mkdir −p / usr / l o c a l / e t c / openvswitch
$ ovsdb−t o o l c r e a t e / usr / l o c a l / e t c / openvswitch / conf . db
vswitchd / vswitch . ovsschema
$ ovsdb−s e r v e r −v − −remote=punix : / usr / l o c a l / var /run/ openvswitch /
db . sock \
− −remote=db : Open vSwitch , manager options \
− −pr ivate−key=db : SSL , p r i va t e key \
− −c e r t i f i c a t e=db : SSL , c e r t i f i c a t e \
− −p i d f i l e − −detach − −log− f i l e
$ ovs−v s c t l − −no−wait i n i t
$ ovs−vswitchd − −p i d f i l e − −detach
$ ovs−v s c t l add−br ovsbr1
$ ovs−v s c t l show
Figure 3.6 shows successful installation of OVS after executing the above com-
mands.
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Figure 3.6: Successful Installation of OVS
The next part now is to install Linux container, and for that, we will allocate a
dedicated section as follows:
Linux Containers
Linux containers Rosen (2014) which was introduced in August 2008 Wikipedia con-
tributors (2018) and developed by number of developers from IBM and Google, is
designed to enable virtulization for Linux Operating system, where all containers
share the same kernel as the host. Containers are considered exactly as a regular
virtual machine, with the exception of they use and share the same resources (mem-
ory and kernel) as the host does. We choose to continue with our implementation
and testing using containers because of the simplicity of managing the containers and
attaching them to OVS, all using the host terminal command.
In order to install Linux containers (lxc), some dependencies are required to run
it efficiently, which are:
• One of glibc, musl libc, uclib or bionic as your C library
• Linux kernel >=3.8
• libcap (to allow for capability drops)
• libapparmor (to set a different apparmor profile for the container)
Next, run the following command to install lxc:
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$ sudo apt-get install lxc
To create Linux containers (virtual machines) for our experiments, we use the
following code:
$ sudo lxc-create -t ubuntu -n u1
which indicate ubuntu version container with name u1 is created. Figure 3.7 show
successful creation of this container. We created 3 containers, two are acting as
normal clients (web server and FTP server), while the last one is acting as IDS/IPS
components.
Figure 3.7: Successful Creation of LXC Ubuntu Container
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3.2.2 Network Configuration
In this section, we will explain the networking environment setup for our proposed
work. First of all, as mentioned earlier, the work is dependent on SDN environment,
which include SDN controller and data-plane switches. For the purpose of implemen-
tation and testing, we used POX controller Kaur et al. (2014), which is python-based
controller that has several modules, including but not limited to: layer-2 switching,
layer-3 switching, etc.
The next step is to start linking the OVS to each container. It is critical for the
containers not only be able to communicate with each other, but also to have access
to the internet. For such a purpose, the switch need to have the capability to forward
each container’s traffic to the internet and to other containers as well. Therefor, the
following configuration is used to allow container to be connected dynamically to the
OVS. Once a container start, it will be assigned a physical interface, and the logical
port of it will be connected to the OVS. Moreover, if the container shutdown, the
created logical port will be deleted from the OVS connected port, to no flood the
OVS with unwanted bridges and ports.
In order to connect the container to OVS, the following must be done:
1- Edit the file in /etc/lxc/default.conf as follows:
2- After creating a container, edit it’s configuration file as follows:
This step is essential after creating any container, otherwise, it will not connect
to the OVS and will fail in starting.
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Figure 3.8: OVS Main Configuration File
3- Create the following new two files as follows:
$ sudo touch / e tc /network/ i f−up . d/ lxcora02−asm2−i fup−ovsbr1
$ sudo touch / e tc /network/ i f−up . d/ lxcora02−asm2−ifdown−ovsbr1
4- Edit the created files as follows:
a ) sudo vim / etc /network/ i f−up . d/ lxcora02−asm2−i fup−ovsbr1
#!/ bin /bash
BRIDGE=”ovsbr1 ”
sudo ovs−v s c t l −−may−e x i s t add−br $BRIDGE
sudo ovs−v s c t l −−i f−e x i s t s del−port $BRIDGE $5
sudo ovs−v s c t l −−may−e x i s t add−port $BRIDGE $5
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Figure 3.9: Container Main Configuration File
b) sudo vim /etc/network/if-up.d/lxcora02-asm2-ifdown-ovsbr1
#!/ bin /bash
BRIDGE=‘ovsbr1 ‘
#ovsBr= o v s b r 1
#ovs−v s c t l i f −e x i s t s del−port ${ovsBr} $5
NET CONFIG=/etc /network/ i n t e r f a c e s
ovs−v s c t l −−i f−e x i s t s del−port $BRIDGE $5
sed − i −n ’/ al low−’$BRIDGE’ ’ $5 ’/{ s / .∗/ / ; x ;N;N;N;N;N; d ;}
; x ; p ; ${x ; p ;} ’
$NET CONFIG
sed − i ’ / . / , /ˆ $ / ! d ’ $NET CONFIG # remove l ead ing blank l i n e s
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At this stage, OVS and containers are connected and container should be able to
communicate with public network.
In order to proceed with the experiments, as shown in Figure 3.3, an Intrusion de-
tection system (IDS) and Vulnerability Scanner module (Stinger) are needed. The
Stinger module installation and preparation is explained in the Appendix chapter of
this Thesis. As of IDS configuration, we used Snort Roesch et al. (1999) intrusion
detection system for it’s popularity and ease of configuration. Snort was installed
in container 3 to inspect any abnormal behavior for the traffic that is identified as
vulnerable by Stinger module. To apply specific traffic forwarding, we used OVS port
mirroring, which is basically a function to copy all traffic as it is from one port to
another one.
To do this, we used the following commands:
sudo ovs−v s c t l −− −−id= @m c r e a t e mirror name=mirror0 −−
add br idge ovsbr1 mi r ro r s @ m
sudo ovs−v s c t l s e t mirror mirror0
output port=d11cc9f9 −1287−464 f−8454−68205 e896fd7
sudo ovs−v s c t l s e t mirror mirror0
s e l e c t \ d s t \ por t=c524609b−4830−4bc8−bbe7−4ddfbcc29b7c
where output is the uuid of the ovs port that we want to send the traffic to, and
dst port is the uuid port the we want to listen to it’s ongoing traffic (any traffic going
to that port). in order to get the uid of a port, we list all ports and their ids by the
follwing command:
$ sudo ovs−v s c t l l i s t port
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Figure 3.10: Example of uuid for an OVS Port
Port mirroring prevent any usage of the port that is receiving packets. Therefor,
we added an additional port to container 3 in order to be able to communicate with
other containers and the public network as well. Adding a physical port is done by
changing the container main configuration file as follows:
# Template used to c r e a t e t h i s con ta ine r :
/ usr / share / l x c / templates / lxc−ubuntu
# Common c o n f i g u r a t i o n
l x c . i n c lude = / usr / share / l x c / c o n f i g /ubuntu . common . conf
# Container s p e c i f i c c o n f i g u r a t i o n
l x c . r o o t f s = / var / l i b / l x c /u3/ r o o t f s
l x c . mount = / var / l i b / l x c /u3/ f s t a b
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l x c . utsname = u3
lxc . arch = amd64
# Network c o n f i g u r a t i o n
#lxc . network . name = eth0
lx c . network . type = veth
l x c . network . f l a g s = up
#lxc . network . l i n k = ovsbr1
l x c . network . hwaddr = 0 0 : 1 6 : 3 e : 9 d : 3 5 : 4 7
l x c . network . s c r i p t . up=
/ etc /network/ i f−up . d/ lxcora02−asm2−i fup−ovsbr1
l x c . network . s c r i p t . down=
/ etc /network/ i f−up . d/ lxcora02−asm2−ifdown−ovsbr1
#lxc . network . name =eth1
lx c . network . type =veth
l x c . network . f l a g s = up
lxc . network . hwaddr = 0 0 : 1 6 : 3 e : 9 d : 3 5 : 1 0
l x c . network . s c r i p t . up=
/ etc /network/ i f−up . d/ lxcora02−asm2−i fup−ovsbr1
l x c . network . s c r i p t . down=/etc /network/ i f−up . d/
lxcora02−asm2−ifdown−ovsbr1
Finally, we are now able to get IDS generated alerts by designing an API that will
return the source IP and source port number, destination IP and destination port
number. This information is the goal for the controller to create a flow rule that will
40
drop any traffic having the same attributes. Also, this information will be used by
the attack graph module to compute the overall system attack graph. Thus, the goal
was achieved by ensuring only desirable flow will pass through the controller, after
inspection by IDS, and based on the original vulnerability scanning result.
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Chapter 4
SCALABLE ATTACK GRAPH GENERATION
In this chapter, we present our methodology and approach on how we are able
to generate a scalable attack graph after utilizing distributed firewall capability and
SDN environment. The main ideas is to monitor the vulnerabilities in the system
and then embed a path to the graph whenever a vulnerability exist and an active
communication to that vulnerability is being established. Our approach relied on
MulVal tool Ou et al. (2005) to compute the attack graph, and finally we draw it
using d3 javascript library. The evaluation result show an improvement with over
60% in comparison with prior modules .
4.1 Motivation
Attack graph has been used as a modeling tool for the study of multi-hop attacks
in a network. In addition, it has application in a number of areas of network secu-
rity such as vulnerability analysis where a system administrator can understand a
collective impact on network security. However, one of the greatest challenge making
the usability of the attack graph unpractical is its scalability. The relationship be-
tween the generation of attack graph and its scalability is a direct relationship. Thus,
in a large data center network, generating attack graph can exceed our ability to
analyze and understand the relationships between vulnerabilities and system flow’s.
The main motivation is to solve the attack graph’s scalability issue and enhance the
attack graph’s usability and visualization. For this purpose, we utilize the SDN and
DFW technologies for the purpose of controlling the reachability between the data
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center segments by allowing uni-directional links between the segments only, and by
obtaining real-time reachability information from the controller.
The decoupling of control-plane and data-plane in SDN provides more flexibility
to run multiple applications on the SDN controller where each of which has complete
knowledge of the controlled environment. In this case, it is conceivable to design
a model that periodically runs to discover the network topology and fetching newly
added devices, services, or links that can go up or down. Therefore, the output of this
model can be input to the attack graph’s Host Access-Control Lists (HACL). This
will result in constructing real-time attack graph. Although the current deployment
of attack graph proposes to use HACL and obtain such information from a firewall
management tool, it is static and considers any to any relationship for connectivity
between nodes and vulnerabilities Ou et al. (2005).
Our methodology of examining each segment individually in order to construct a
global view attack graph helps us to enforce security policies at a very granular level
to reduce the access policy space and limit the trusted zone between multiple com-
ponents in the network. Deploying DFW with the SDN-based environment will fully
automate the policy configuration. Later, we will explain how reducing the access
policy and integrate it into the attack graph HACL will help in solving the attack
graph’s scalability issue.
4.1.1 Attack Graph Background
The attack graph is a graphical representation of the vulnerabilities in the system.
It shows all the possible paths an attacker may take to compromise the system and
gain the desired level of privileges, taking into account vulnerabilities dependency,
pre-conditions, and post-conditions for building the graph and successful exploita-
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tion.
Previously, Chung et al. (2013), extended the definition of MulVAL attack graph as
Scenario Attack Graph (SAG), as follows:
SAG: SAG =(V,E), where: Vertices V = NC ∪ND ∪NR,
such that C is conjunction node representing exploit, D is disjunction node represent-
ing results of exploit and root node R for initial step of the attack scenario.
Direct edges E: Epre∪Epost, where an edge, e ∈ Epre ⊆ ND×NC means that ND must
exist to reach to N C. an edge e ∈ Epost ⊆ NC×ND means that the output shown by
ND can be reached if NC is satisfied Chung et al. (2013).
The scalability issue of attack graph is a major concern for researchers. It is
of paramount need to design an approach that scales well, especially for large data
center networks. In an attack graph, a cycle might appear where the attacker is able
to exploit vulnerability more than once. This issue will be discussed afterwards.
MulVALOu et al. (2005) is a well-known open source tool to generate an attack
graph. It uses datalog and logic programming as its modeling language. The input
to MulVAL is vulnerability information, which includes but not limited to; Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE-ID) Vulnerabilities (2007), the affected applica-
tion or service, vulnerability consequences (whether the vulnerability results in data
loss, remote exploitation, data integrity, etc). In addition, network reachability infor-
mation, which include for each host: IP address, the vulnerable service or application,
port, and protocol. Vulnerability information, network service information as well as
Host access level in MulVAL are represented as follows:
VulExists ( ’ IP Address ’ , ’CVE ID ’ , Vulnerable s e r v i c e )
NetworkServ ice In fo ( ’ IP Address ’ , Vulnerable s e r v i c e ,
Protocol , Port )
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HACL( s r c addr e s s , d s t addre s s , Protocol , port )
where port means the vulnerable port at the destination node.
MulVAL uses host access-control level (HACL) tuples to model network and fire-
wall configuration, the authors of MulVal used a general rule to test and specify
reachability information (any host can access any host using any port and protocol).
Figure 4.1 shows a simplified version of an attack graph. Let’s consider the attacker’s
Figure 4.1: Sample Attack Graph
goal is to compromise node E2. As can be seen from the Figure, in order to exploit
node E1, the attacker has to gain access to node A1 first through condition C. An
example of pre-condition is:
vulExists (10.0.0.1, CVE-4545, apache1.3.4).
In the second-stage, the pre-condition of exploiting E1 is both access to A1, and
vulnerability exist V. Note that the required connectivity has to be the same as the
one related to the vulnerable service V. In order to exploit node E2, the attacker first
has to compromise node E1, which will lead to a communication link to be created
and hence, continue to the path to E2. Thus an attacker can launch a mulit-stage
attack in order to reach goal node E2, starting from V and C.
The proposed approach computes an attack graph for each sub-network (seg-
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ment). In order to construct the global view of attack graph for the entire system,
we need to consider the post-condition of the resultant sub-attack graphs. If there
is a dependency between these post-conditions (specifically, connectivity between the
segments), then we take these post-conditions and make them as pre-conditions in
the global view attack graph of the system.
After combining post-conditions, state and post-condition tables are created, the
first is to be into the data-plane switches, while the last is for the controller to
keep track of post-conditions of vulnerabilities. This is essential for the controller to
generate the global-view attack graph.
For example consider a segment having three machines, 202.0.0.1, 203.0.0.1, and
203.0.0.2. The first machine has
vu lEx i s t s ( ’ 2 0 2 . 0 . 0 . 1 ’ , ’CVE−1999−0045 ’ , h t t p s e r v e r ) ,
ne tworkServ i c e In fo ( ’ 2 0 2 . 0 . 0 . 1 ’ , h t t p s e r v e r } , tcp , ’ 8 0 ’ ) .
Which has the specified CVE-ID, service, and the associated reachability information
which indicates that the httpserver service is running on port 80 using protocol tcp.
Also, Machine 203.0.0.2 has:
vu lEx i s t s ( ’ 2 0 3 . 0 . 0 . 2 ’ , ’CVE−1999−0511 ’ , windows 2000 ) .
ne tworkServ i c e In fo ( ’ 2 0 3 . 0 . 0 . 2 ’ , windows 2000 , tcp , ’ 7 0 ’ ) .
hac l ( any , any , any , any )
The original attack graph as computed in Ou et al. (2005), will consider reacha-
bility relationship between the machines as any to any as shown above where there
is no added security policy as well. We want to specify the exact connectivity be-
tween the 2 machines by modifying the reasoning rules and add what we consider as
the major variables which are src ip address, dst ip address, dst port, and protocol as
indicated by the vulnerabilities information. In addition, add firewall rules to relate
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vulnerability information to flow rules. This is accomplished by specifying states for
each flow. In order for the attacker to compromise segment 203.0.0.2, they have to
go through 202.0.0.1 and 203.0.0.1 first. Therefore, the post-condition of exploiting
203.0.0.1 becomes pre-condition of 202.0.0.1.
Figure 4.2: Post-Condition Table for The Controller
Tables shown in Figure 3.5 show an example of specifying each flow rule for the
above vulnerability information. The first step is to initiate state lookup by using
the source and destination IP and port number (since we are considering incoming
traffic from outside the segment). If the switch finds the corresponding state, it will
go to XFSM table to take the required action (forward to DPI in state1 for instance).
Otherwise, it will treat the incoming flow by the default state and check the original
flow table maintained by the controller to make the appropriate decision. To illustrate
more on the reachability information, HACL should be modified according to the
exact topology fetched from the SDN controller. for instance, machine 202.0.0.1 can
reach machine 203.0.0.2 using port 70 and TCP protocol. HACL should look like:
hacl(’202.0.0.1’,’202.0.0.1’,tcp,’70’)
Firewall starts by looking for a match into state table for the incoming traffic. State
table contains the exact source and destination IP and port, it will then go to XFSM
table to check what action should be taken.
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4.1.2 Parallel Attack Graph Computing
In order to collect vulnerability information and scanning results, we assume that
a dedicated agent (Stinger) inside each segment exist to perform scanning operation,
and local attack graph generation. The method of scanning is out of scope of this
thesis, we assume that once scanning is done, vulnerability information will be sent to
SDN controller’s state table module to generate the state and post-condition tables
for both, local and global attack graph. Next, the machine will fetch connectivity
information from the controller, along with the resultant vulnerability information
and compute the attack graph for that particular segment.
Scalable Attack Graph
After computing an attack graph for each segment. We now have small, multiple
sub-attack graphs. We want to inspect how to combine all components to generate
the overall graph for the system. The obvious next step now is to combine all smaller
sub-graphs into a bigger one using divide and conquer. However, it is not that easy
due to merging problem. Specifically, when we create a bi-directional link between
two segments, which makes the segment-based partitioning useless and as a result,
we have to re-inspect all the vulnerability dependency among two segments, which
is a non-trivial task especially if there are multiple and dependable vulnerabilities in
the two segments. This leads to the following two claims:
Claim 1: Uni-direction communication between two segments allows us to merge
sub-attack graphs, taking into account the ability of the attacker to reach from one
host to another through direct communication. Specifically, this direct communication
is the one required to compromise the vulnerability residing in the victim machine.
Here we must note that the link between segments meant the reachability between
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vulnerabilities. For example, when VM A from segment 1 explores a vulnerability in
VM B on an open TCP port n, and if the DFW allows the connection from A to B
on TCP port n, then we say there is a link from segment 1 to segment 2, in which
the link is directional and the vulnerability is reachable. Using the stateful DFW,
we can easily create uni-directional vulnerability exploration links between segments
since the DFW can maintain the connection’ states, and thus, the DFW can block
unwanted connection requests.
Claim 2: The different vulnerabilities between the segments might have a de-
pendency between them. This dependency might create a cycle where the attacker is
able to reach revisited segment. In order for the attacker to compromise a node E2
from node E1, they have to exceed the exploitability threshold T, which is setup by
the system user. The threshold here is the number of nodes that the attacker need to
bypass. If the attacker can not exceed this threshold, they should not be able to reach
to node E2.
To realize both Claim 1 and Claim 2, we present the following algorithm 1:
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Algorithm 1 Segment Attack Graph construction
1: procedure Segment Attack Graph Generation
2: for all Segments do
3: V ul Scan← Conduct V ulnerability Scanning
4: Monitor Vulnerable target through IDS.
5: if new IDS alert from V ulScan is found: then
6: Block attacker’s attempt.
7: Send Vulnerability and connectivity info to AG Analyzer.
8: Compute Segment’s Local-View AG.
9: procedure System Attack Graph Generation
10: for all segments do
11: Fetch segment’s Vulnerability & Connectivity info.
12: if Link s1 to vulnerability ∈ s2 is found: then
13: Add link from s1’s AG to s2’s AG.
14: if Global-View AG exist: then
15: find attack graph cycles().
16: if cycle C is detected and |C| <T then
17: prune(C).
18: Construct-Global View Attack Graph.
19: Redraw system’s attack Graph.
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Algorithm 1 explains the procedure of constructing a local-view attack graph for
each segment in the system, and finally generating the global view attach graph for
the entire system by examining the post-conditions resulted from compromising each
vulnerability (gaining connectivity to a target node having a vulnerability). The
first step of the algorithm is to conduct a comprehensive vulnerability scanning on
the target system. Next, Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is configured to monitor
the targeted vulnerable system. This step is essential in order to prevent blocking
legitimate flow originated from normal users, and only detect the malicious flow orig-
inated from an attacker. If the IDS generate and alert, then the DFW block that
communication and the vulnerability and connectivity information is sent to the at-
tack graph analyzer module. A local-view attack graph is generated for each segment
in the system after words, and finally, all segments’ local-view attack graphs is sent
to global-view attack graph generation module to analyze the dependency between
those sub-graphs and generate the entire system attack graph without the need of
recomputing the attack graph at each time.
If the segments have no vulnerability dependency between them, specifically, a
network connectivity from the source segment to the target segment, then the system
user can only see and inspect each segment’s local attack graph. On the other hand,
after constructing the global-view attack graph, a cycle might appear which will allow
the attacker to go back to another node by compromising an intermediate node.
The Algorithm will run for each segment t in the overall network segment n in the
system. In order to evaluate the occurrence of a cycle after the global-view attack
graph is generated, we use Tarjan’s strongly connected components algorithm Tar-
jan (1972) to implement the cycles() to find all cycles in the graph. If a cycle is
detected, then we set the exploitability threshold T. T can be set as the number of
hops or exploitability of a given attack path computed based on path probability that
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is exploitable by the attacker. For a longer cycle, we assume that the attacker has
negligible chance to deploy attacks, and thus, we do not need to consider it to recon-
struct the attack graph. If the cycle is less than the threshold T, then we apply the
prune function. In practice, the prune function can be achieved by simply selecting
a link on a cycle to disable the link by changing DFW filtering rules to break the
cycle. The complexity of Algorithm 1 is dominated by the cycle() function, which is
the complexity of running Tarjan’s algorithm: O(E+V) as well as the complexity of
MulVal that is O(n2). Therefore, the worst-case complexity time analysis is O(n2)
where n is the number of nodes in the graph. The algorithm approve to have a bet-
ter performance in comparison with older approaches, where DFW and SDN are not
utilized. On the other hand, the best case scenario complexity is determined if the
number of segments in the system is large. We divide the total number of nodes N
by the number of segments, and therefor, the best case complexity is determined by
O(n2/S), where S is the number of segemnts in the system.
The attack graph can be generated by utilizing network topology and the vul-
nerability information for each segment. In order to generate the global view attack
graph, the post-condition of exploiting VM1 becomes pre-condition for VM3, and the
post-condition for that is the pre-condition for VM5. Figure 4.8 shows the global
view of the system’s attack graph after using 3S and Figure 4.3 shows the attack
graph without 3S, and it is clear how complicated the previous existing approach
even with a small number of vulnerabilities and nodes in the system. It is important
to emphasize the DFW role here. The uni-direction communication is maintained by
the DFW to ensure the attacker can only advance to one segment, without the ca-
pability of coming back to the same point of origin. This connectivity information is
synchronized with the controller. As we mentioned earlier, the controller now is able
to generate the global view of the attack graph, with the help of uni-direction commu-
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nication enforced by DFW. For simplicity, we purposely tested our approach on small
number of segments. However, once we compute the attack graph for one segment
which could be the difficult part due to large number of vulnerabilities. Thus, if there
are multiple segments, then we only have to merge the sub-attack graph by checking
for the vulnerability dependency, and do computation only once for the sub-attack
graph.
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4.1.3 Results
Figure 4.4: System Architecture of The Proposed System
In order to evaluate and measure the performance of our proposed approach. First,
we present the following evaluation equation:
Let S be the number of segments in the system and H is the total number of Hosts in
the system. The asymptotic complexity of Mulval Ou et al. (2005, 2006) complexity
is bounded by: O(H2). Using our proposed approach, we intend to divide the network
into a total number of segments T, where each segment Ti having the same number of
hosts H. To analyze the best case and worst case complexity of the proposed research,
we calculate the best case performance by:
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Cost(S) =
H
T
2
(4.1)
On the other hand, the worst case complexity is where the number of segments in the
segment is equal to one (no segmentation is occurring), thus, the worst case complexity
remain as it is (equal to O(H2)). The larger the number of segmentation, the closer the
complexity is becoming linear, which shows how significantly the proposed approach
is better and more efficient than the MulVal approach. Figure 4.5 show the line plot of
equation 4.1, the complexity is approaching to linear scale as the number of segments
increases.
Figure 4.5: Complexity Analysis
As of the machine used for graph computation, we used the Intel I7 2.6-GHz CPU
machine with 16GB RAM. Next, we created several attack scenario cases with a dif-
ferent number of vulnerabilities for each segment, and by using a system similar to
the one shown in Figure 4.4 to test the approach with the generated test scenarios.
Figure 4.6 shows the number of nodes and edges with and without using 3S. It should
be noted that those test cases are for the global view attack graph and does not reveal
any information about the local attack graph. Initially, we begin by considering a
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Figure 4.6: Performance Analysis
few number of vulnerabilities. As the number of vulnerabilities increase, the number
of nodes and edges in the graph increase with and without applying 3S. When the
number of vulnerabilities is about 30, number of nodes dropped from 187 to 91, the
percentage of improvement is over 50%. The percentage continues to increase as we
go to the right of the graph up until when the number of vulnerabilities is 1029, the
number of nodes decline from over 13 thousand nodes to 5 thousand and number of
edges decreases from over 22 thousand to 7 thousand with 61% percentage improve-
ment. This is due to a large number of vulnerabilities in the system overall, and
the absence of control over the connectivity in the system (the attacker may trans-
fer from any machine to another). Specifically, the graph now contains the actual
connectivity information obtained by the controller. In addition, uni-directional links
allow removing several nodes and edges from the graph without affecting the actual
connectivity between the segments.
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Figure 4.7: Attack Graph Generation Time with and without 3S
The time required to generate attack graph without using our proposed solution
scale at very large pace (O(H2)). On the other hand, after deploying 3S, the time
required to generate an attack graph is much less than that and could go to as low
as a few seconds. For security risk assessment, it is necessary to construct the attack
paths from the source to the target node. However, in a large enterprise network,
constructing the attack paths can take a long time, as shown in Figure 4.7. Neverthe-
less, after deploying our proposed solution, the needed time is reduced significantly
from thousands to milliseconds, which shows how efficient the proposed system is.
As for graph clarification and interpretation, we used javascript d3 library to
redraw the attach graph and output a Bayesian based shape. As an example, the
resultant graph is shown in Figure 4.8 contains information about the vulnerable
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node, as well as the conditional probability of compromising a node in the graph if the
link was not blocked and if the attacker was able to satisfy the pre-condition and post-
conditions of exploiting the vulnerabilities. The probability formula is derived from
Chung et al. (2013), we refer the reader to that paper for further explanation. The
green color of the node mean the node has a low probability of getting compromised,
while the red one has more likelihood of being attacked by adversary. If the mouse
over the node occur, the exact text of the node will be shown, however, for sack of
simplicity, we did not include the Figure with its text to not disturb the reader with
the interconnected texts.
Figure 4.8: Bayesian-based Attack Graph
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we presented a new framework that allow system administrator to
manage and analyze the security state for a large data-center network. Firewalls are
a powerful component of any system, which ensure smooth flow for network traffic.
Every system will need some way to analyze its security state. For that purpose, we
proposed to combine both, firewalls and attack graphs as a visual representation of
vulnerabilities and critical paths an adversary may take to exploit the system. Soft-
ware Defined Networking are an emerging technology that enable the decoupling be-
tween the control-plane and data-plane, which will allow a great utilization of network
devices, as will as reducing the conflict and ease the management of the networking
system. our goal in the thesis was to utilize the SDN capabilities and increase the
system security situation. Usage of SDN controller allow me to cordinate the security
state between the switches, where the goal is to come-up with a distributed firewall
to limit the attacker capability from exploiting multiple nodes in the system. DFW
will help in reducing the number of nodes that are generated by the attack graph
module. Specifically, the exact connectivity between the network segment turned out
the play a major rule to generate a scalable attack graph in realtime fashion.
Future work will include incorporating a module in the SDN controller to control
and insert a host-level firewall rules in the container machines directly. Also, building
an UI portal to allow the administrator to examin exact security polices deployed in
the system, insert rules directly into the host-based firewall, and most of all, keep
generating the attack graph continuously and enhance the visualization for easier
interpretation.
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APPENDIX A
SOURCE CODE
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For Stinger vulnerability scanner module, please visit:
http://gitlab.thothlab.org/ScienceDMZ/Stinger.git
For the rest of the code and implementation details, please visit my Github repos-
itory at:
https://github.com/hekmatbacha/MasterThesis
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